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This chapter explains and employs a constructivist, interactionist theory of knowledge 
that has come to be known as the perspective of ‘embodied cognition’. That view has 
roots in earlier developmental psychology, and in sociology, and more recently has 
received further substance from neural science. It yields a basis for a cognitive theory of 
the firm, with the notion of cognitive distance between people, the resulting view of 
organization as a cognitive focusing device, the need for external relations with other 
organizations to compensate for organizational myopia, and the notion of optimal 
cognitive distance between firms for innovation by interaction.  
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This chapter adopts a constructivist, interactionist perspective on knowledge that 
emerged from the developmental psychology of, in particular, Piaget and Vygotsky. 
According to this view, cognition is not only the basis of action but also a result from it, 
and ‘intelligence is internalized action’. We perceive, interpret and evaluate the world on 
the basis of cognitive categories that we construct in interaction with that world, 
particularly in interaction with other people. These categories constitute our ‘absorptive 
capacity’ (Cohen & Levinthal 1990).  As a result, people see the world differently to the 
extent that they have developed their cognition along different life trajectories, in 
different environments. In the literature on management and organization, this view has 
also been called the ‘activity view’ of knowledge (Blackler 1995), and it has been widely 
adopted by many scholars of organization (e.g. Weick 1979, 1995). This view also has 
roots in sociology, in particular in the ‘symbolic interactionism’ of G.H. Mead (1934). 
More recently it has received further substance from neural science, in what has come to 
be known as ‘embodied cognition’, which will be discussed in some detail in this chapter.  
This perspective has far-reaching implications for economics and management, and 
enables improved understanding of the ‘knowledge economy’ and the ‘network 
economy’, or what has recently received the fashionable label of ‘open innovation’ 
(Chesbrough 2003).  Clearly, if knowledge arises from interaction with others, in a   2
‘knowledge economy’ interaction between firms in networks becomes crucial. So, the 
claim here is that this perspective of cognition is important for a proper understanding of 
the ‘knowledge’ and the ‘network’ economy.    
On a more fundamental level, with its view of the individual as mentally constituted in 
interaction with others, and hence socially, while preserving individual variety of 
cognition, this perspective enables us to transcend the ‘methodological individualism’ of 
economics as well as the ‘methodological collectivism’ of (some) sociology, in a new 
‘methodological interactionism’, and thereby helps to make a novel combination of 
economics and sociology, in what may perhaps be seen as a newly emerging integrative 
behavioural science.  
Also, this perspective has implications for the theory of the firm, including a theory of 
inter-organizational relations (IOR’s). If people construct their cognition differently along 
different life paths, this yields  ‘cognitive distance’, and this, in turn, yields the need for 
an organization to act as a ‘focusing device’, in order to sufficiently align cognition, by 
some ‘organizational cognitive focus’,  to utilize opportunities for complementary 
capabilities. By definition, this yields some organizational myopia, and to compensate for 
this firms require outside relationships with other firms, at greater cognitive distance. 
This also has implications for the theory of innovation, particularly in innovation 
networks. The question there is to what extent the structure of a networks and a firm’s 
position in it affect variety of cognition and abilities to absorb it.   
The chapter consists of two parts. The first part introduces embodied cognition, and 
specifies its contrast with the traditional ‘representational–computational’ view of 
cognition. The second part analyzes the implications for economics and management.  
 
 
THE NEW PERSPECTIVE OF EMBODIED COGN ITION
1 
 
The traditional view 
 
The perspective of embodied cognition stands in opposition to the ‘Representational-
Computational’ (RC) view that has been the dominant view in cognitive science. That 
view assumes that knowledge is constituted by symbolic mental representations and that 
cognitive activity consists of the manipulation of (the symbols in) these representations, 
called computations (Shanon 1988: 70). According to Shanon (1993), the representations 
according to the RC view are: 
 
1.  symbolic: in the use of signs there is a separation of a medium and the content 
conveyed in it 
2.  abstract: the medium is immaterial; its material realization (physiology) is of no 
relevance 
3.  canonical: there is a given, predetermined code which is complete, exhaustive and 
determinate 
4.  structured/decomposable: well-defined atomic constituents yield well-formed 
composites 
5.  static: mind is the totality of its representations, structure and process are well 
                                                 
1 Much of this first part is taken, in an abbreviated form, from Nooteboom (2000, Chapter 6)   3
demarcated. 
 
  The basic intuition is that behaviour is based on beliefs, desires and goals, and 
representations are postulated as entities that specify them (Shanon 1993: 9). The 
reconstruction of variety as variable, combinatorial operations on fixed elements is an 
ancient ploy: the ploy of decomposition. In formal grammar it yields the ‘standard principle 
of logic, ... hardly ever discussed there, and almost always adhered to’ (Janssen 1997: 419), 
that the meaning of a compound expression is a function (provided by rules of syntax) of 
the meanings of its parts. It was adopted by Frege, in his later work (Frege 1892, Geach 
and Black 1977, Thiel 1965, Janssen 1997).  
The motivation for this view is in a respectable scientific tradition to yield a 
parsimonious reconstruction, in terms of stable entities and procedures of composition of 
those entities into a variety of structures, to account for orderly and regular human 
behaviour across a large variety of contexts. It also explains how people can understand 
sentences they never heard before. A subsidiary motivation is that by interposing the 
cognitive as an intermediate, abstract level between psychological phenomenology and 
physiology we can circumvent the need for a full reconstruction in terms of physiology, 
and we can thereby evade reductionism. However, there are empirical and theoretical 
objections to such a symbolic, semantic, representational view (Shanon 1988, Hendriks-
Jansen 1996). 
If meanings of words were based on representations, it should be easy to retrieve them 
and give explicit definitions, but in empirical fact that is often very difficult. A second 
empirical point is that people are able to re-categorize observed objects or phenomena, so 
that representations vary, if they exist, and then they are no longer determinate. Words 
generally have more than one meaning, and meanings vary across contexts. Closed, i.e. 
exhaustive and universal definitions that capture all possible contexts are often either 
infeasible or extremely cumbersome. For most definitions one can find a counter-example 
that defeats it.  
 
For example: what is the definition of ‘chair’? Should it have legs? No, some 
chairs have a solid base. Not all chairs have armrests or back rests. Neither has a 
stool, but we distinguish it from a chair. A child’s buggy seat on a bike has a 
backrest, but is not called a chair. At least in some languages, a seat in a car is 
called a chair. A chair is used for sitting, but so is a horse. A cow is not a chair, but 
years ago I saw a newspaper item ‘watch him sitting in his cow’, with a picture of 
someone who used a stuffed cow for a chair. If it were customary for people living 
along a beach to collect flotsam to use for chairs, it would make sense, when 
walking along a beach, to point to a piece of flotsam and say ‘look what an 
attractive chair’. Not to speak of professorial chairs. 
 
  Another empirical point of fact, recognized by many (e.g. Putnam 1975, Winograd 
1980), is that meanings are unbounded, and open-ended with respect to context. Novel 
contexts do not only select from a given range of potential meanings, but also evoke novel 
meanings. Novelty is produced in contextual variation (Nooteboom 2000). Summing up, 
representations cannot be exhaustive, or determinate, or single-valued, or fixed. As 
Wittgenstein (1976) proposed in his ‘Philosophical investigations’, in his notion of   4
‘meaning as use’, words are like tools: their use is adapted to the context, in the way that a 
screwdriver might be used as a hammer. 
One of the theoretical problems, recognized by Fodor (1975), who was a proponent of 
CR, is the following: if cognitive activity is executed by computation on mental 
representations, the initial state must also be specified in terms of those representations, so 
that all knowledge must be innate. That is preposterous, and certainly will not help to 
develop a theory of learning and innovation.
 Another theoretical objection is that if one 
admits that meaning is somehow context-dependent, as most cognitive scientists do, also if 
they are adherents of the RC view, then according to the RC view context should be 
brought into the realm of representations and computations. Shanon (1993: 159) 
characterizes this as the opening of a ‘disastrous Pandora’s box’. To bring in all relevant 
contexts would defeat the purpose of reducing the multiplicity of cognitive and verbal 
behaviour to a limited set of elements that generate variety in the operations performed on 
them. Furthermore, we would get stuck in an infinite regress: how would we settle the 
context dependence of representations of contexts? Note that contexts in their turn are not 
objectively given, somehow, but subject to interpretation. As Shanon (1993: 160) put it: ‘If 
the representational characterization of single words is problematic, that of everything that 
encompasses them is hopeless’. 
  In recent developments in the logic of language, the notion has come up of  ‘discourse 
representation theory’. In the words of van Eijck and Kamp (1997: 181):  ‘Each new 
sentence S of a discourse is interpreted in the context provided by the sentences preceding 
it ...The result of this interpretation is that the context is updated with the contribution made 
by S.’ The contribution from this theory is that it yields a dynamic perspective on 
semantics: truth conditions are defined in terms of context change. This theory can even be 
formalized so as to preserve compositionality (Janssen 1997). However, I propose that the 
dynamic of interpretation and context is more creatively destructive than is modelled in 
discourse representation theory: the interpretation of a novel sentence can re-arrange the 
perception of context and transform interpretations of past sentences.  
  Summing up, compositionality is problematic due to context dependence plus the fact 
that contexts themselves are subject to interpretation and re-interpretation. Or, to put it 
differently: the meaning of the whole is not only determined by the meaning of the parts, 




I don’t see how we can account for learning and innovation on the basis of representations 
that satisfy any, let alone all, of the assumptions of RC: separation of medium and content; 
a predetermined, complete, exhaustive and determinate code; well-defined and static 
constituents of composites. However, this does not mean that we need to throw out the 
notion of mental representations altogether. If we do not internalize experience by means of 
representations, and relegate it only to the outside world, how would cognition relate to that 
world? How can we conceptualize rational thought other than as some kind of tinkering 
with mental models, i.e. representations that we make of the world?   
  Despite his radical criticism of the RC view, even Shanon (1993: 162) recognized this: 
‘On the one hand, context cannot be accounted for in terms of internal, mental 
representations ....; on the other hand, context cannot be accounted for in terms of external   5
states of affairs out there in the world ....’. For a solution, he suggests (1993: 163) that 
‘Rather, context should be defined by means of a terminology that, by its very nature, is 
interactional. In other words, the basic terminology of context should be neither external 
nor internal, but rather one that pertains to the interface between the two and that brings 
them together’. Similar criticism and conclusions were offered by Hendriks-Jansen (1996), 
who concluded that we should take a view of  ‘interactive emergence’, and Rose (1992), 
who proposed the view of ‘activity dependent self-organization’. This leads to the ‘situated 
action’ perspective. This perspective entails that rather than being fully available and 
complete prior to action and outside of context, mental structures (‘representations’) and 
meanings are formed by context-specific action. 
One could say that up to a point the situated action view goes back to early 
associationist theories of cognition, proposed, in various forms, by Berkeley, Hume, 
William James and the later behaviourist school of thought (Dellarosa 1988: 28, Jorna 
1990). However, a crucial difference with behaviourism (notably the work of Skinner and 
his followers) is that here there is explicit concern with internal representation and mental 
processing, even though that does not satisfy the axioms of the RC view.  
  Nevertheless, in some important respects the ‘situated action’ view seems opposite to 
the RC view. It proposes that action is not so much based on cognitive structure as the other 
way around: cognitive structure is based on action. However, the cognitive structuring that 
arises as a function of action provides the basis for further action. Thus both are true: action 
yields cognitive structuring, which provides a new basis for action. Rather than taking one 
or the other position I take both, in a cycle of development. Knowledge and meaning 
constitute repertoires from which we select combinations in specific contexts, which yield 
novel combinations that may shift repertoires of knowledge and meaning. Such shifts of 
knowledge and meaning occur in interaction with the physical world, in technological 
tinkering, and in social interaction, on the basis of discourse (cf. Habermas’ 1982, 1984 
notion of ‘communicative action’). 
Situated action entails that knowledge and meaning are embedded in specific contexts 
of action, which yield background knowledge, as part of absorptive capacity, which 
cannot be fully articulated, and always retain a ‘tacit dimension’ (Polanyi 1962). This 
view is also adopted, in particular, in the literature on ‘Communities of practice’ (COP, 
Brown & Duguid 1991, 1996, Lave & Wenger 1991, Wenger & Snyder 2000). This is 
related to the notion of ‘background’ from Searle (1992). Interpretation of texts or 
pictures is based, to some extent, on unspecified, and incompletely specifiable, 
assumptions triggered in situated action. When in a restaurant one asks for a steak, it is 
taken for granted that it will not be delivered at home and will not be stuffed into one’s 
pockets or ears. As a result, Canonical rules, i.e. complete, all-encompassing and codified 
rules, for prescribing and executing work are an illusion, since they can never cover the 
richness and variability of situated practice, which require improvisation and 
workarounds that have a large tacit component that cannot be included in codification of 
rules, as recognized in the literature on COP (Brown & Duguid 1991). The proof of this 




   6
According to developmental psychologists Piaget and Vygotsky intelligence is internalized 
action. By interaction with the physical and social environment, the epistemological subject 
constructs mental entities that form the basis for virtual, internalized action and speech, 
which somehow form the basis for further action in the world. This internalized action is 
embodied in neural structures that can be seen as representations, in some sense, but not 
necessarily in the symbolic, canonical, decomposable, static sense of mainstream cognitive 
science. In contrast with Piaget, Vygotsky (1962) recognized not only the objective, 
physical world as a platform for cognitive construction, but also the social world with its 
affective loading. While according to Piaget a child moves outward from his cognitive 
constructs to recognition of the social other, according to Vygotsky the social other is the 
source of the acquisition of knowledge and language. Vygotsky proposed the notion of 
ZOPED: the zone of proximal development. This refers to the opportunity for educators to 
draw children out beyond their zone of current competence into a further stage of 
development. In language acquisition by children, a phenomenon on which Piaget and 
Vygotsky agreed was that at some point children engage in ego-centric speech, oriented 
towards the self rather than social others, and that this subsequently declines. Piaget 
interpreted this as an outward movement from the self to the social other; a ‘decentration’ 
from the self. Vygotsky ascribed it to a continued movement into the self, in an ongoing 
process of formation and identification of the self and development of independent thought. 
The reason that egocentric speech declines is that overt speech is partly replaced by ‘inner 
speech’. Before that stage, however, speech is preceded by and based on sensori-motor 
actions of looking, gesturing, pointing, aimed at satisfying a want. 
 
Werner and Kaplan (1963) demonstrated ‘that reference is an outgrowth of motor - 
gestural behaviour. Reaching evolves into pointing, and calling-for into denoting’. 
They note that ‘it is in the course of being shared with other people that symbols 
gain the denotative function’.  
 
  Both Shanon and Hendriks-Jansen use the notion of the ‘scaffolding’ that the context 
yields. It is reminiscent of Vygotsky’s notion of ZOPED. Literally, a scaffold is used in the 
building of an arch: stones are aligned along a wooden scaffold until they support each 
other and the scaffold can be removed. The paradigmatic case in cognitive development of 
children is the support provided to the infant by its mother. According to the account given 
by Hendriks-Jansen (1996), infants do not have an innate language capability as claimed by 
Chomsky. 
 
They have innate repertoires of activity sequences, such as facial ‘expressions’, eye 
movements and myopic focusing, kicking movements, randomly intermittent bursts of 
sucking when feeding, random gropings. At the beginning these movements do not 
signify anything nor do they seek to achieve anything, and they certainly do not 
express any internal representations of anything. The mother, however, instinctively 
assigns meanings and intentions where there are none, and this sets a dynamic of 
interaction going in which meanings and intentions get assigned to action sequences 
selected from existing repertoires on the occasion of specific contexts of interaction. 
Thus the random pauses in sucking are falsely picked up by the mother as indications 
of a need to jiggle the baby back into feeding action. In fact it is not the jiggling but   7
on the contrary the stopping of it that prods the baby to resume the action. The taking 
turns in stops and jiggles does not serve any purpose of feeding, as the mother falsely 
thinks, but a quite different purpose, for which evolution has ‘highjacked’ what was 
thrown up by previous evolution. It is ‘used’ to ready the child for the ‘turn taking’ 
that is basic for communication: in communication one speaks and then stops to let 
the other speak. Here, the child acts, stops, and triggers the mother to action, who 
jiggles and then stops and thereby triggers the baby to action. 
At first, the infant can focus vision only myopically, which serves to concentrate on 
the mother and her scaffolding, not to be swamped by impressions from afar. Later, 
the scope of focusing vision enlarges, and the infant randomly fixes its gaze on 
objects around it. The mother falsely interprets this as interest and hands the object 
to the infant, and thereby generates interest. The child is then prone to prod the 
mother’s hand into picking up objects, first without and later with looking at the 
mother. 
 
  Groping and prodding develop into pointing, which forms the basis for reference that is 
the basis for meaning and language. While the child points and utters sounds, the mother 
responds with the correct words, and so language develops. In egocentric speech the child 
starts to provide his own scaffolding, which further contributes to the development of his 
own identity. Along these lines, meaning and intentionality do not form the basis for action 
but arise from it, with the aid of scaffolds from the context. 
  As indicated, according to Vygotsky overt speech is next internalized, to yield virtual 
speech, and cognitive constructs serve as a basis for virtual action: to explore potential 
actions mentally, by the construction of mental models, deduction, mental experiments. 
While cognition is not necessarily in terms of language, and can to some extent develop 
without it, its development is tremendously enhanced by language, in the development of 
internal speech. 
  The notion of scaffolding lends further depth to the debate, in the COP literature, on the 
role of specific actions contexts, in specifying and elaborating the meaning of words, and in 
generating new meanings.  
 
Connectionism and neural Darwinism 
 
As indicated, the situated action view contests the idea of semantic representations as a 
necessary and universal basis for all knowledge, but it allows for representations in some 
sense as the basis for at least some behaviour. For example, it might be consistent with 
connectionism: the view that cognition is based on neural nets, which can generate 
systematic regularity without the explicit specification of generative rules in underlying 
representations. Such nets are representations in some sense, generated, by some 
mechanism, from experience in the world (cf. Smolensky 1988). 
In parallel distributed processing (PDP, cf. Rumelhart and McClelland 1987) two radical 
steps are taken. One is to no longer accept the computer metaphor of sequential processing 
according to some algorithm, but to approach knowledge and learning in terms of parallel 
processes that interact with each other. The second is that knowledge is not stored in units, 
to be retrieved from there, but in patterns of activation in connections between units. 
Knowledge is implicit in this pattern of connections rather than in the units themselves   8
(Rumelhart, Hinton and McClelland 1987: 75). What is stored is the connection strengths 
between the units that allow the patterns to be recreated (McClelland, Rumelhart and 
Hinton 1987: 9).    
Edelman’s (1987, 1992) ‘neural Darwinism’ seems to yield a viable perspective for 
understanding how situated action might work in terms of neural networks (or ‘neuronal 
groups’, as he calls them). Here, the development of neural groupings, in patterns of 
connected neural activity, is seen as evolutionary, and more specifically as Darwinian, in 
that neuronal groups are too a large extent randomly generated, and then selected and 
reinforced according to success in the actions that they generate. In this way, the selection 
environment for individual action ‘generates’, by selection, mental structures in the way 
that in evolutionary economics the competitive and institutional environment ‘generate’, 
by selection, organizational structures. This yields an explanation of how activity gets 
internalized in the form of neural structures.  
As an example of context-dependence of cognition, according to Edelman memory, 
both short and long term, is not the ‘retrieval’ of some entity, but a process of re-
categorization; of re-activating, and in the process possibly shifting, the process of 
selection among neuronal groups. Hence, memory also is context-dependent, and that the 
process of recall may affect the template of future recall. 
 The difference between connectionist models of PDP and neural selectionism is that 
the former aims to operate on some notional, abstract level between symbols and neural 
networks (Smolensky 1988) whereas the latter operates directly on the level of neuronal 
groups. PDP retains symbols as some higher level, aggregate, emergent outcome of lower 
level processing. 
  There is further evidence for the constructivist, activity based view from other modern 
research of cognition, in addition to the work of Edelman.
2 While the brain has some 
domain specificity, i.e. localization in the brain of cognitive functions, this specificity is 
plastic, i.e. is not fixed prior to experience, but is constructed from input. For example, 
blind people have been shown, with brain imaging techniques, to employ the visual cortex 
for object recognition. Another result that illustrates activity based cognition is that after 
people learn to use objects as tools, accompanied by activity, observed with brain imaging, 
in motor areas of the brain, the mere observation of the tools triggers brain activity not only 
in the visual cortex, but also in that motor area. It has been shown that people from 
different cultures focus on different parts of images, and observe change in patterns 
differently.  
In this way, Edelman’s work, and other results from recent cognitive research, underpin 
the activity-based, constructivist view and its criticism of the earlier representational-
computational view, which was still part of Herbert Simon’s view, and of some 
contemporary artificial intelligence.  
The central point here is that a mechanism of selection among neuronal structures shows 
in what way performance may precede competence; how meanings may be constructed 
from discourse (sense making) and knowledge from action (intelligence as internalized 
action), and provide the basis for ongoing action. This account seems consistent with 
Johnson-Laird’s (1983) account of mental models and Hendriks-Jansen’s account of how 
children learn language. This approach indicates how mental structures might emerge from 
                                                 
2 Source: ‘Cognition: From molecules to mind’, conference at the Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Amsterdam, 29 March 2006.     9
experience in a way that allows for openness and variability across contexts. It offers an 
evolutionary perspective rather than a perspective of rational design. The programmatic 
significance of evolutionary theory is that it forces us to explain development not as the 
result of conscious, goal-directed, top-down, rational design by decomposition of functions, 
but as selection from among a repertoire of activity sequences, on the occasion of the 
demands and opportunities of specific contexts. 
  Summing up, as a basis for situated action theory, and the interactionist, constructivist 
view of knowledge and meaning that it supports, I employ an evolutionary, connectionist 
theory of cognitive development. On the occasion of experience, selections and re-
combinations are made from partly overlapping and competing patterns of neural 
connections (Rumelhart and McClelland 1987, Edelman 1987, 1992, Rose 1992). 
According to these theories, performance, in interaction with and with support from the 
context, yields competence as much as competence yields the basis for performance. This 




The principles of situated action, internalized action and neural Darwinism yield what has 
come to be known as the perspective of embodied cognition. Embodied cognition lends 
further support to an interactionist, constructivist theory of knowledge that is adopted, 
explicitly or implicitly, by most authors in the literature on organizational cognition and 
learning (for surveys, see Hedberg 1981, Cohen & Sproull 1998, Meindl, Stubbard & 
Porac 1998). According to this view, people 
 
1.  construct their cognitive categories, or mental models, by which they perceive, 
interpret and evaluate phenomena, 
2.  in interaction with their physical and, especially, their social environment.  
 
This view also appears in the ‘symbolic interactionism’ of G.H Mead (1934, 1984), in 
sociology, and has later been called the ‘experiential’ view of knowledge (Kolb 1984) 
and the ‘activity’ view (Blackler 1995). In the organization literature, this view has been 
introduced, in particular, by Weick (1979, 1995), who reconstructed organization as a 
‘sense-making system’. 
The mental frameworks that result from construction constitute ‘absorptive capacity’ 
(Cohen & Levinthal 1990). People can turn information into knowledge only by 
assimilating it into those frameworks, and thereby they shape and mold it. Consequently, 
to the extent that people have developed their cognition in different environments or 
conditions, they interpret, understand and evaluate the world differently (Berger & 
Luckman 1966). As a result, there is greater or lesser ‘cognitive distance’ between people 
(Nooteboom 1992, 1999). 
  A constructivist perspective can slide, and has done so, into radical post-modern 
relativism. According to the latter, the ‘social constructionist’ notion of knowledge 
entails that since knowledge is constructed rather than objectively given, any knowledge 
is a matter of opinion, and any opinion is as good as any other. This would lead to a 
breakdown of critical debate. Embodied realism saves us from such radical relativism in 
two ways. First, our cognitive construction builds on bodily functions developed in a 
shared evolution, and possibly also on psychological mechanisms inherited from   10
evolution, as argued in evolutionary psychology (Barkow et. al. 1992). Second, by 
assumption we share the physical and to some extent also a social world on the basis of 
which we conduct cognitive construction. That constitutes a reality that is embodied 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1999). As a result of shared psychological mechanisms of cognitive 
construction and a shared world from which such construction takes place, there is a 
basic structural similarity of cognition between people. This provides a basis for debate. 
Indeed, precisely because one cannot ‘climb down from one’s mind’ to assess whether 
one’s knowledge is properly ‘hooked on to the world’, the variety of perception and 
understanding offered by other people is the only source one has for correcting one’s 
errors. 
A key characteristic of embodied cognition is that it sees cognition as rooted in brain 
and body, which are in turn embedded in their external environment. This is consistent 
with the ‘situated action’ perspective indicated above. The embodiment of cognition 
entails a continuum rather than a Cartesian duality between rational evaluation, feelings 
and underlying physiological processes in the body.  This view that cognitive functions 
build on non- cognitive, bodily and emotional functions was also prominent in the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (1942, 1964), and was present, to some extent, in the work 
of Simon (1983). See also Nussbaum (2001). It plays an important role in Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (1999) book on ‘philosophy in the flesh’. Building on the philosophy of 
Spinoza, Damasio (2003) demonstrated a hierarchy of cognition, where rationality is 
driven by feelings, which in turn have a substrate of physiology, in a ‘signalling from 
body to brain’.   
As a result, in this chapter, the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘cognition’ have a wide 
meaning, going beyond rational calculation. They denote a broad range of mental 
activity, including proprioception (i.e. use of hands and grope, feel and grasp objects), 
perception, sense making, categorization, inference, value judgments, and emotions. Note 
that the notion of cognitive distance then also refers to a variety of dimensions of 
cognition. In particular, people may be close in their normative ideas about how people 
should deal with each other, while they are very different in their substantive knowledge. 
That is what we often find in organizations, where people with different, complementary 
competence come together with a shared purpose and style of interaction.   
In the construction of meaning from actions in the world people employ metaphors, as 
discussed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). We grasp our actions in the physical world, in 
which we have learned to survive, to construct meanings of abstract categories, starting 
with ‘primary metaphors’ that build on proprioception. Thus, for example, good is ‘up’, 
because we stand up when alive and well, while we are prostrate when ill or dead. The 
analysis is important not only in showing how we cope in the world, but also in showing 
how metaphors can yield what Bachelard (1980) called ‘epistemological obstacles’. I 
suspect that the primary metaphors, informed by experience with objects in the world, 
yield a misleading conceptualization of meanings, for example, as objects. Since objects 
retain their identity when shifted in space, we find it difficult not to think of words 
retaining their meaning when shifted from sentence to sentence. Underlying this is the 
‘museum metaphor’ of meaning: words are labels of exhibits that constitute their 
meaning, and the ‘pipeline metaphor of communication’: with words meanings are 
shipped across a ‘communication channel’. Meanings and communication are not like   11
that, but we find it difficult to conceptualize them differently. In short, in abstract 
thought, we suffer from an ‘object bias’. 
 
 





If knowledge arises from assimilation of perceptions into cognitive structures that have 
been constructed in interaction with the world, the self is social, in that it is constructed 
from interaction, but also individual, in that its constructions and interpretations are to 
some extent idiosyncratic since they depend on individual life trajectories. This yields a 
principle of methodological interactionism that transcends both the methodological 
individualism that forms part of the ‘hard core’ (in the sense of Lakatos 1970, 1978) of 
the ‘research programme’ of mainstream economics (Weintraub 1988), and the 
methodological collectivism of (some) sociology, according to which individuals are 
programmed by their social environment.  
  As a result, embodied cognition may yield a perspective for integrating economics and 
sociology in a new behavioural science. What this can yield, more specifically, in terms 
of the theory of the firm, including a theory of inter-organizational relationships, and 
theory of innovation in inter-organizational relationships, is shown, to some extent, in the 
remainder of this chapter. This chapter cannot exhaust the full potential of 
methodological interactionism. For example, that principle opens economics and 
management up to insights from social psychology in human interaction and decision 
making that are of great importance, particularly in matters that involve combinations of 
rationality and feelings, as in conflict resolution and the making and breaking of trust 
(Nooteboom 2002, Six 2004). Here, the focus is on more general theory of organization. 
For that, I make a connection with the sociology of Georg Simmel. Simmel  (1950, 
first published 1917) and Maslow (1954) proposed that people have different levels of 
needs, motives and cognitive make-up, where lower level needs must be satisfied before 
higher levels can come into play (called the principle of ‘prepotency’), and people are 
more similar on the deeper levels than on the higher levels. In the classic categorization 
of Maslow, on the deepest level we find the most instinctive, automatic, unreflected and 
difficult to control drives of bodily physiology, such as hunger and sexual appetite, which 
are highly similar between different people. Next, we find needs of shelter, safety, and 
protection. Next, love and affection. Next, social recognition, esteem and legitimation. 
Finally, on the highest level, individual expression and self-actualization. Higher levels 
are more idiosyncratic, and hence show greater variety between people, than lower levels.  
While there is some empirical evidence for a hierarchy of needs (Hagerty 1999), 
especially the principle of pre-potency is far from accurate. The ‘higher level’ need for 
esteem and self-actualization can lead people to make great sacrifices on the ‘lower 
levels’ of safety, shelter, and food. Man has a strong, basic, and perhaps even instinctive 
drive, it appears, toward metaphysics, as exhibited in the form of religious rituals of 
burial in the earliest forms of Homo Sapiens Sapiens. That may even be part of the 
characterization of our species, in distinction with earlier hominoids. Also, while people   12
may have the same needs on the physiological level of food and sex, the foods and 
behaviours they choose in order to satisfy those needs vary greatly. Apparently, higher 
levels find their expression in a variety of ways of satisfying needs on lower levels, in 
different ‘life styles’.  
Nevertheless, in spite of these qualifications and additions, it still seems true that there 
are different levels of needs and motives, and that people are more similar on lower levels 
of more basic needs, perhaps including spiritual ones, and more varied on higher levels of 
more sophisticated needs. This connects with the notion of cognitive distance. If people 
make sense of the world on the basis of mental categories that are constructed from 
interaction with the world, they see and interpret the world differently to the extent that 
they have developed their cognition along different life paths. Cognition is more similar 
to the extent that the corresponding phenomena are similar, as in mechanics subject to 
laws of nature, and is more different in abstractions and in cultural and social life.  
Simmel (1950) proposed that, as a result, in a randomly composed group of people, 
what people have in common resides on lower, more basic, unreflected levels of needs 
and object-oriented cognition as the size of the group increases. What random masses 
have in common is basic needs and instincts. He also proposed that the larger and more 
heterogeneous the group, the more norms and rules of conduct for the group are negative, 
indicating what is forbidden or undesirable, rather than positive, indicating goals and 
actions to achieve them. The underlying principle of logic is similar to the principle that a 
theory (with universal propositions) can be falsified but not verified. It is better possible 
to specify what has been found to be false (in the current context: impermissible) than to 
specify all that may be possible (here: desirable). To specify what is forbidden entails 
freedom to do what is not forbidden, while to specify what may be done is either partial, 
leaving options open, and is then not very functional, or it forbids what is not specified, 
and then is inherently conservative.  
The phenomena of levels and variety of cognition have important implications for 
organizations and IOR’s. 
 
Theory of the firm 
 
While the theory of the firm is a familiar branch of economics, it is more appropriate to 
develop a theory of organization more widely, in which the firm is a special case, as is 
the practice in the management literature.  
Several economic theories of organization, in particular transaction cost economics 
(TCE), look at organizations as systems for governance, to reduce transaction costs, by 
means of incentives, monitoring and control. However, increasingly it is recognized that 
for a variety of reasons ex-ante incentive design is problematic. Due to uncertainty 
concerning contingencies of collaboration, and limited opportunities for monitoring, ex 
ante measures of governance are seldom complete, and need to be supplemented with ex-
post adaptation. Such uncertainties proliferate under present conditions of professional 
work and, especially, under the conditions of innovation that form the focus of this 
chapter.  Professional work requires considerable autonomy for its execution and is hard 
for managers to monitor and evaluate, let alone measure. Rapid innovation increases 
uncertainty makes formal governance, especially governance by contract, difficult to 
specify, which increases the importance of collaboration on the basis of trust. If   13
specification of detailed contracts is nevertheless undertaken, it threatens to form a 
straightjacket that constrains the scope for innovation. Furthermore, the attempt to use 
contracts to constrain opportunism tends to evoke mistrust that is retaliated by mistrust, 
while in view of uncertainty there is a need to use trust rather than contract.   
Beyond governance, we should look at competence or capability (Nooteboom 2004). 
Inspired by the work of Penrose (1959), much research of management and organization  
sees the firm (or organization more widely) as generating firm-specific organizational 
capabilities. The present chapter can be seen as extending, or deepening, the Penrosian 
view on the basis of the perspective of embodied cognition. From a competence 
perspective, incentives by individual rewards may obstruct teamwork, while if the 
interactionist view of learning is true, that is crucial for innovation. As noted before, if 
the situated action view of competence is true, then canonical rules, i.e. all-encompassing 
and codified rules, for executing work are an illusion, since they can never cover the 
richness and variability of situated practice, which require informal improvisation and 
workarounds that have a large tacit component that cannot be included in codification of 
rules, as recognized in the literature on COP (Brown & Duguid 1991).  
In conclusion, there is a need for an alternative to ex ante incentive alignment, and a 
basis for ex post adaptation. Using the perspective of embodied cognition, the view in 
this chapter is that organization functions primarily as a cognitive ‘focusing device’, for 
reasons of both competence and governance. In order to achieve a specific joint goal, on 
a higher level than basic needs, the categories of thought (of perception, interpretation 
and value judgment), of the people involved must to some extent be aligned and lifted to 
a higher level than the basic instincts that a random group would share (Kogut & Zander 
1992, Nooteboom 1992, 2000). Alignment entails that cognitive distance must be limited, 
to some extent and in some respects.  
More precisely, organizational focus has a dual purpose. The first is to raise shared 
cognition to a level higher than basic needs and instincts, consistent with, and supporting 
the goal of the organization. Also, while outside an organization, in society more widely, 
norms or rules of conduct tend to be negative, indicating what actions are forbidden or 
undesirable, organizations need positive norms, indicating goals and ways of achieving 
them. The second purpose of organizational scope is to reduce cognitive distance, in 
order to achieve a sufficient alignment of mental categories, to understand each other, 
utilize complementary capabilities and achieve a common goal. Note that, given the wide 
notion of cognition used here, focus has perceptual, intellectual and normative content. It 
includes views of how people ‘deal with each other around here’.  
To achieve such focus, organizations develop their own specialized semiotic systems, 
in language, symbols, metaphors, myths, and rituals. This is what we call organizational 
culture. This differs between organizations to the extent that they have different goals and 
have accumulated different experiences, in different industries, technologies and markets. 
Organizational culture incorporates fundamental views and intuitions regarding the 
relation between the firm and its environment (‘locus of control’: is the firm master or 
victim of its environment), attitude to risk, the nature of knowledge (objective or 
constructed), the nature of man (loyal or self-interested) and of relations between people 
(rivalrous or collaborative), which inform content and process of strategy, organizational 
structure, and styles of decision-making and coordination (Schein 1985).    14
  Organizational focus also has a dual function, of selection and adaptation. In selection, 
it selects people, in recruitment but often on the basis of self-selection of personnel 
joining the organization because they feel affinity with it. In adaptation, it socializes 
incoming personnel, with initiation, and focuses their capabilities, in training. To perform 
these functions, focus must not only have cognitive content, but must also be embodied in 
some visible form. Such form is needed for several reasons. For people to share cognition 
they need expression in language or other signs. Form is also needed to stabilize the 
mental processes underlying organizational focus. As such, organizational focus has the 
same function as the body has for individual cognitive identity. In the theory of embodied 
cognition it has been recognized that cognition, with its drives of multiple feelings, is 
diverse and volatile, and often limitedly coherent, and lacks a clearly identifiable, stable, 
mental identity of the ego, and that such identity, in so far as it can be grasped, is due, in 
large part, to the body as a coherent source of feelings and their underlying physiology. 
Similarly, cognitive activities in an organization require some embodiment to crystallize, 
direct and stabilize cognition and communication within and outside the organization.  
To perform its functions, organizational form has a number of possible features, 
corresponding with different ways in which organizational focus can work. For both the 
internal function of adaptation, with expression, crystallization, stabilization and 
direction, and the external function of selection by signalling, we find symbols, such as 
logo’s, ‘mission statements’, advertisement and external reporting. More for the internal 
function we find the exemplary behaviour of organizational heroes, often a founder of the 
organization, corresponding myths, and rituals. Culture, with its signs, heroes, myths and 
rituals, aims to represent and engender a certain style of behaviour (Simmel 1950: 341) 
whereby the individual becomes part of a collective intentionality. More formalized 
forms of organization are procedures, for reporting, decision making, recruitment, 
contracting, and the like. An important more formal organizational form is legal identity, 
aimed at securing the interests of different stakeholders. Legal identity varies with the 
focal stakeholders and their interests. Legal identity is needed to regulate ownership and 
decision rights, liability, contracting, and the like. Here, firms distinguish themselves 
from organizations more generally. A firm is defined as an organization of capital and 
labour aimed at profit, in contrast with, for example, a foundation that is not aimed at 
profit, and where profits are re-absorbed in the organization. The legal identity of firms 
varies according to the regulation of liability, ownership, availability of shares, 
employment status, tax, and the like. Here, there still is a connection with TCE, in that 
under the authority of an employment relationship norms and forms of conduct can be 
imposed without having to engage in a contract for each individual transaction. As such, 
legal identity functions to formalize and consolidate organizational culture.   
Elements of this idea of organization are not new. It connects with the idea, in the 
organization literature, that the crux of an organization is to serve as a ‘sensemaking 
system’ (Weick 1979, 1995), a ‘system of shared meaning’ (Smircich 1983) or 
‘interpretation system’ (Choo 1998). I propose that this yields a more fundamental reason 
for firms to exist than the reduction of transaction costs, although transaction costs are 
also part of the story (Nooteboom 2000). In a firm, people need to achieve a common 
purpose, and for this they need some more or less tacit shared ways of seeing and 
interpreting the world and regulating collaboration.  
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Boundaries of the firm 
 
A theory of the firm, or of organizations more widely, should account for the boundaries of 
the organization and for inter-organizational relationships (IOR’s). Effects of firm size have 
formed a central subject in economics. On the competence side are effects of static, 
productive efficiency, in scale and scope, which can take a variety of forms, including 
division of labour, and effects of dynamic efficiency, in Schumpeterian debates on whether 
large or small firms are the more innovative. A discussion of the literatures on those 
subjects lies beyond the scope of the present chapter. The point to be made here is that 
debates on effects of firm size have turned out to be somewhat misguided in that small 
firms may compensate for their weaknesses by collaboration in networks (or clusters, or 
industrial districts), while large firms may compensate for their weaknesses by a greater or 
lesser disintegration or decentralization of units within the firm. Here, clusters of firms are 
also forms of organization, but they are not firms, while large firms can operate more or 
less as clusters. The difference lies in the ‘cohesiveness’ of cognitive focus and in legal 
identity.  
Here I propose the general principle that the boundary of an organizational entity in 
general, and of a firm in particular, is determined by the cohesiveness of the focus, in 
combination with its legal formalization. Note that the notion of organizational focus does 
not entail the need for people to agree on everything, or see everything the same way. 
Indeed, such lack of diversity would preclude both division of labour and innovation within 
the firm. As discussed in Nooteboom (1999) there is a trade-off between cognitive distance, 
needed for variety and novelty of cognition, and cognitive proximity, needed for mutual 
understanding and agreement. In fact, different people in a firm will to a greater or lesser 
extent introduce elements of novelty from their outside lives and experience, and this is a 
source of both error and innovation (Dimaggio 1997). Nevertheless, there are some things 
they have to agree on, and some views, often tacit, which they need to share, on goals of 
the organization, norms, values, standards, outputs, competencies and ways of doing things.   
  The cohesiveness of organizational focus has two dimensions, at least, of inclusiveness 
or scope and tightness. If the life world of people has many dimensions, inclusiveness 
denotes the number of dimensions included in organizational focus. This is closely related 
to the point, made earlier, that cognitive distance entails difference in a variety of 
dimensions of cognition. Tightness denotes similarity, or proximity, in the dimensions 
involved. A large inclusiveness or scope of focus entails that there is alignment on many 
issues, and tightness entails that on each issue there is little ambiguity and variety of 
meaning, norms and standards. A highly inclusive scope entails that more of a person’s life 
world is included in the organization, in ‘thick’ relationships, carrying many aspects of the 
life world and of personality, and a less inclusive scope entails less personalized, ‘thinner’ 
relationships.  
The notion of the cohesiveness of focus connects with the distinction Simmel (1950) 
made between a person’s function in an organization, which takes up only part of his 
personality, and his full personality. This is echoed in the distinction that Ring and van de 
Ven (1994) made between roles that people play and behaviour ‘qua persona’. In a 
cohesive focus, role and persona get closer. With a highly cohesive focus, the liberty of 
people and variety among them are constrained. Extremes of this are found in cliques, and 
especially in clandestine, secluded or secret societies (Simmel: 345-376). Outside freedom,   16
to engage in external relationships, is constrained by the high inclusiveness of 
organizational focus, by which there are few dimensions of the life world left that are not in 
some way already regulated within the group. Inside freedom is constrained by the 
tightness of focus, with little room to deviate from narrow norms. Both inside and outside 
sources of variety, and hence of innovation, are highly constrained.   
While inclusiveness and tightness are separate dimensions of scope, high inclusiveness 
does tend to generate tightness, as follows. When high inclusiveness forms an obstacle to 
outside relationships, which occurs to the extent that organizational focus imposes 
meanings not shared outside, then people are cut off from sources of fresh or different 
ideas, and they will tend to gravitate towards meanings shared inside the organization, 
which increases tightness, not because it is imposed by focus, but because it emerges from 
decreasing cognitive distance. Thus large scope and tightness together tend to reinforce 
themselves.  
An implication of the notion of a focusing device is that the need to achieve a focus 
entails a risk of myopia: relevant threats and opportunities to the firm are not perceived. 
To compensate for this, people, and firms, need complementary sources of outside 
intelligence, to utilize ‘external economy of cognitive scope’ (Nooteboom 1992). This 
yields a new perspective on inter-organizational relationships, next to the usual 
considerations, known from the alliance literature. It also fits well with the prevalent idea 
in the literature on innovation systems that innovation derives primarily from interaction 
between firms (Lundvall 1988).  
The notion of a firm as a focusing device yields an alternative to TCE, for an 
explanation of the boundaries of the firm. The present theory yields a prediction that is 
opposite to that of classical transaction cost economics, and which is particularly relevant 
in innovation. With increasing uncertainty, in terms of volatility of technology and 
markets, firms should not integrate activities more, as transaction cost theory predicts, but 
less, because the need to utilize outside complementary cognition is greater. The 
argument from TCE was that under uncertainty one needs the greater power of 
management by fiat within a firm, to monitor behaviour and resolve conflicts. Here, the 
counter-argument is that under the volatility of innovation the risk or organizational 
myopia is greater and hence there is a greater need for outside complementary cognition, 
with ‘external economy of cognitive scope’.  The prediction of less rather than more 
integration under uncertainties of innovation has been confirmed empirically by Colombo 
& Garrone (1998), who found that in technologically volatile industries, as measured by 
patent intensity, the likelihood of alliances rather than mergers and acquisitions is higher 
than in the absence of such volatility. 
 
Communities and firms 
 
A firm may consist of a single community of practice (COP), as the smallest unit of 
organization , typically with a relatively cohesive focus, or it may be a ‘community of 
communities’ (Amin & Cohendet 2003), with a less cohesive focus.  Recall that a focus can 
be cohesive in either or both of two ways: relationships in the community are thick, 
comprising many dimensions of personality, or they are tight, with little variety in the 
relevant dimensions, or both. In fact, the notion of COP allows for a great variety of 
different kinds of community (Bogenrieder & Nooteboom 2004). One type, apparently   17
closest to the original idea of a community of ‘practice’ (Brown & Duguid 1991, Lave & 
Wenger 1991) is a thick and tight community where people interact on many issues (highly 
inclusive), on a daily basis, with little ambiguity of meanings (tight), in the execution of a 
practice. Another type is that of a community of professionals from different contexts of 
action, who exchange knowledge, such as scholars at a conference, for example. Here, 
focus is narrow in scope but often tight, with people talking precisely about few things. 
One can have a group with wide focus and little tightness, with people talking vaguely 
about many things, such as practitioners from different practices talking about many 
aspects of their practice. Strangers typically talk vaguely about few things. A cohesive 
group, with small internal distance in many dimensions of cognition, is likely to be very 
efficient in a static sense, or in exploitation, but inefficient in a dynamic sense, or in 
‘exploration’ (March 1991, Nooteboom 2002). To keep cohesive groups from cognitive 
inertia, it may be needed to rotate people across them, to keep up variety, i.e. to maintain 
some cognitive distance. A cohesive group can increase variety on the basis of outside 
contacts, but must then relax its tightness, to allow for variety of meaning.  
The size of the smallest community depends on how ‘systemic’, as opposed to ‘stand–
alone’ (Teece 1986, Langlois & Robertson 1995, Postrel 2002), the structure of the 
activity is. Exploitation is systemic when there is a complex division of labor, with many 
elements and a dense structure of connections between them, with tight constraints on 
their interfaces. These connections yield interdependence, with different types, as 
recognized by Thompson (1967): sequential (output of one step is input for the next), 
reciprocal (inputs and outputs both ways) and pooled interdependence (common use of a 
shared resource). An example of high systemicness is an oil refinery. In more stand-alone 
systems, elements of the system are connected with few other elements, and connections 
are loose, allowing for some ambiguity and deviation from standards on interfaces. This 
allows for separate communities with a high degree of autonomy. An example is a 
consultancy firm. A third type is a modular system. Here, there are also multiple, 
connected elements, as in the systemic case, but different elements embody different, 
separable functions, and standards on interfaces between them allow for variety, where 
different modules can be plugged into the system as alternative ways of performing 
specific functions. Then, modules may be separate communities.   
The small firm often has a limited range or portfolio of technologies, products and 
competencies. The firm typically coincides with a single COP, with this smaller unit having 
separate legal identity, while in large organizations the smaller communities do not have 
such separate legal identity. As a result, they are vulnerable, with limited diversification of 
risks, limited specialization in functions, limited economies of scale and scope, and limited 
career perspectives. They also have both the potential advantages and disadvantages of a 
cohesive scope. They often, though not always and not necessarily, have a cohesive focus, 
in relatively thick and tight, often highly personalized relationships. One cause of high 
inclusiveness, and perhaps the most important one, lies in limited specialization of labour, 
due to lack of scale and scope. As indicated before, high inclusiveness generates tightness 
if inside norms or meanings are incompatible with outside ones. This may result from 
radical novelty, where the firm is generating new, unfamiliar meanings. High tightness may 
also result from the cognitive stamp that the entrepreneur puts on his small organization, 
where he interacts directly with his personnel. In this way, radically innovative, small firms   18
may isolate themselves and thereby close themselves off from the sources of application 
and further innovation.  
This yields one of several paradoxes of the small firm. On the one hand, small size, 
personalized, thick, informal relationships, integration of tasks among few people, and 
direct contacts, internally and outside, e.g. with customers, enable high flexibility and 
motivational power of identification with the firm. On the other hand there is potential for 
suppression of freedom and variety, and of isolation from the environment (cf. Nooteboom 
1994).  
The large firm typically has a wider range of activities, with more or less cohesive focus 
in internal communities with a narrower range of activities, and an overall organizational 
focus which has limited scope, with people having less in common across the organization, 
but possibly with a high degree of tightness in a few aspects of cognition, particularly 
concerning normative issues of overall purpose and style of interaction.  
Small firms may compensate for their weaknesses with collaboration in networks or 
industrial districts, to spread risks, and to obtain economies of scale and scope, mimicking 
large firms in some of their features. Somewhat perversely, perhaps, for dynamic efficiency 
the greatest benefit of industrial districts may be that there is flexibility of configuration 
from the fact that firms that do not fit in new constellations can more easily be dropped 
than departments of firms can be. Large firms can obtain the benefits of smallness by 
mimicking small firms in COP, while maintaining benefits of integration in the form of 
economies of scale and scope, and diversification of risks. Their limited scope of overall 
organizational focus allows for a wide variety competence, and for personal freedom. 
However, the tightness of focus needed for governing a wide range of activity, in 
combination with limited opportunities for shedding parts of the organization, due to their 
inclusion in an overall legal entity, may inhibit the flexibility of configuration and variety 
of purpose that is conducive to radical innovation.  
 
Innovation by interaction 
 
Especially from an evolutionary perspective (Nelson & Winter 1982), heterogeneity or 
variety is a crucial source of innovation, and this has been taken up in the alliance 
literature (Stuart & Podolny 1996, Almeida & Kogut 1999, Rosenkopf & Nerkar 2001, 
Fleming 2001, Rosenkopf & Almeida 2003, Ahuja & Katila 2004). However, that 
literature does not explain how, precisely, heterogeneity produces innovation. 
Furthermore, heterogeneity in networks has two dimensions that are seldom explicitly 
distinguished. One is the number of firms involved, and the pattern of ties between them, 
and the other is the difference, in particular cognitive distance, between them. Between 
firms, in contrast with people, cognitive distance is the difference between the cognitive 
foci of firms, with two main dimensions of technological knowledge/competence and 
moral principles for internal governance.  
A large steam of literature has indicated only the problems rather than also the benefits 
of such cognitive distance. In a study on alliance formation in the semi-conductor 
industry, Stuart (1998) argued that the most valuable alliances are those between firms 
with similar technological foci and/or operating in similar markets, whereas distant firms 
are inhibited from cooperating effectively. In a similar vein, the diversification literature 
argues that most is to be learned from alliance partners with related knowledge and skills   19
(Tanriverdi & Venkatraman 2005), or from areas that firms already possess capabilities 
in (Penner-Hahn & Shaver 2005). In the literature on international business also, a 
pervasive view is that cognitive distance is a problem to be overcome. Johanson & 
Vahlne (1977, 1990) employed the notion of ‘psychological distance’, which is seen as 
having an adverse effect on cross-cultural communication. When learning is discussed, in 
that literature, it is mostly seen as learning to cope with transnational differences, by 
accumulating experience in cross-border collaboration (e.g. Barkema et al. 1997), rather 
than taking those differences as a potential source of learning to change home country 
products or practices.  
  Nooteboom (1999) proposed an interaction between the advantages and disadvantages 
of distance, as follows. The ability to understand each other (in absorptive capacity) and 
to collaborate declines with cognitive distance, whereas the novelty value of the 
relationship, i.e. its potential to generate Schumpeterian novel combinations, increases 
with distance. If the two effects are linear with respect to distance, and if learning or 
innovation performance of the relationship is proportional to the mathematical product of 
novelty value and mutual absorptive capacity, the result is an inverted-U shaped 
performance as a function of distance, as illustrated in Figure 1. This implies an optimal 
cognitive distance, which is large enough for partners to offer each other something new, 
but not so large that they cannot understand each other or come to agreement.  
 
----------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
In Figure 1, the downward sloping line of absorptive capacity is not fixed. It is subject 
to an upward shift, as a function of the accumulation of knowledge in relevant fields and 
experience in IOR’s. That yields a shift to higher optimal cognitive distance, as illustrated 
in the figure.  
Wuyts et. al. (2005) put the hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance to two empirical, 
econometric tests. The first test was conducted on a combination of the basic hypothesis 
of optimal cognitive distance with the second hypothesis that cognitive distance 
decreases with increased frequency and duration of interaction. As argued by Gulati 
(1995) and others (Simmel 1950, McAllister 1995, Lewicki & Bunker 1996), familiarity 
may breed trust, which is good for governance. However, it may also reduce variety of 
knowledge, which is bad for innovative performance. This yields the hypothesis of an 
inverted U-shaped relation between radical technological innovation and the extent to 
which firms ally with the same partners over time. That hypothesis was tested on data on 
vertical alliances between biotech and pharma companies, and was supported.  
In fact, the derived hypothesis is subject to nuance. If two partners have access to 
other, non-overlapping partners, so that they are continually being refreshed with new, 
non-overlapping knowledge, cognitive distance between them is maintained, so that the 
relationship may remain innovative even when it lasts long. This is, in fact, the point, or 
part of the point, of Burt’s (1992) notion of bridging structural holes.  
The second test by Wuyts et al. was conducted on a combination of the basic 
hypothesis of optimal cognitive distance with a second hypothesis that the likelihood of a 
collaborative alliance increases with the expected performance of collaborative   20
innovation. This yielded the derived hypothesis that the likelihood of an alliance for 
innovation has an inverted U-shaped relation with cognitive distance. That hypothesis 
was tested on data on horizontal alliances in ICT industries. Cognitive distance was 
measured by differences in degrees of specialization in different dimensions of 
technology, inferred from patent data. Partial support was found. Technology-related 
measures of cognitive distance were not found to have any significant effect, but several 
indicators of differences in firms’ organizational characteristics proved to have the 
expected inverted U-shaped effect. Several considerations were offered to explain why 
organizational aspects turned out to be more important than technological ones in ICT 
industries.  
Nooteboom et al. (2005) conducted a more complete empirical, econometric test, on 
the basis of a large set of data on inter-firm alliances over a ten-year period, in a variety 
of industries. Cognitive distance was reduced to technological distance, which was 
measured on the basis of correlation between profiles of technological knowledge 
composed from patent data. Innovative performance was measured as new patents, in 
successive years, with a distinction between exploratory patents, in new patent classes, 
and exploitative patents, in patent classes in which a firm already has patents. Absorptive 
capacity was made endogenous, in that the downward sloping line of absorptive capacity 
(cf. Figure 1) was taken as a function of cumulative past R&D. The hypothesis of 
performance as an inverse-U shaped function of cognitive distance was confirmed, 
including the further hypothesis that optimal distance is higher for exploration than for 
exploitation. The latter can de attributed to a higher slope of the novelty line, in Figure 1.   
The study also tested for an effect of cumulative experience in alliances on absorptive 
capacity, but found none. It did yield an additional effect that was not hypothesized. The 
results indicated that cumulative experience in R&D not only raises the level of 
absorptive capacity (in an upward shift of the corresponding line, see Figure 1), but also 
that the upward slope of the line denoting novelty value decreased. This implies a 
principle of decreasing returns to knowledge, or a ‘boredom effect’. The more knowledge 
one accumulates, the further afield one has to go, to more exotic sources or partners, to 




This chapter explores the implications of a theory of embodied cognition for the fields of 
economics and management in general and for the theory of the firm and theory of 
innovation in particular. In general, embodied cognition yields a perspective for 
transcending the methodological individualism of economics and the methodological 
collectivism of sociology, in a principle of methodological interactionism, which may 
enable an integration of economics and sociology, in a new behavioural science. 
Embodied cognition yields the notion of cognitive distance between people, which 
poses a problem of organization. In order to achieve a shared purpose, cognition must be 
aligned to some extent. This yields the notion of organization as a focusing device, in a 
reduction of cognitive distance between people. The boundary of an organization in 
general and a firm in particular is determined by the cohesiveness of organizational focus, 
i.e. the scope of cognition involved, and the tightness of cognitive alignment, together   21
with the legal form in which focus is embodied. Organizations vary in size, according to 
their range of activities and the cohesiveness of their scope. 
Organizational focus yields myopia, which generally needs to be compensated in 
relationships with outside organizations, at a greater cognitive distance than within the 
organizations. Here, between organizations, cognitive distance is defined as differences 
in organizational focus. For learning by interaction, there is a trade-off between negative 
effects of cognitive distance, in lack of mutual understanding and ability to collaborate, 
and positive effects, in yielding cognitive variety as a source of Schumpeterian novel 
combinations. This yields the notion of optimal cognitive distance in interaction for 
innovation. 
Many extensions and related issues could not be discussed in this chapter. The 
analysis of innovation by collaboration between firms extends into the analysis of 
network effects of structure and strength of ties (Gilsing & Nooteboom 2005). There is 
much more to be said about instruments of governance within and between firms. The 
analysis far from exhausts the potential of methodological interactionism. Embodied 
cognition yields the basis for a theory of invention as a function of shifts in context 
(Nooteboom 2000). It also yields an opening for the integration of insights from social 
psychology (Nooteboom 2002, Six 2004).    22
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